I've been teaching my 8th grade confirmation Sunday school class about the Trinity the past two weeks. I've really enjoyed it even if I was sad that I don't have enough time to really dig deep with them on this issue.
There is one thing that I've been thinking through that has really bothered me the last few days. As I prepare for Sunday school I try to think through various issues the kids may raise and attempt to prepare answers for them. One issue that I've been thinking through in anticipation of the kids was the heresy of Modalism. Even though this issue didn't come up I've been thinking a lot about Modalism the past few days. Just to be clear I'm not thinking about it in a "maybe it's right" sort of way. I completely affirm with the Fathers and the councils that Modalism is a heresy and that it incorrectly describes the Trinity. What I've been thinking about is the soteriological ramifications of modalism.
I've spent the last three years reading, believing, and praying trinitarian doctrine. I affirm the truth brought forth in the seven ecumenical councils of the Church and am resolutely Trinitarian in every way. I can could go on and on explaining why certain Christological heresies strike right at the heart of our ability to be redeemed by God. I can explain to you why it is primarily a salvific issue that Mary be called Theotokos and not Christotokos (as the Nestorian heresy taught), I can tell you how Arianism distorts God's plan of salvation, and I can tell you why I believe that the insertion of the Filoque into the Nicene Creed creates a propensity for Modalism in the West.
Despite all this, when I was thinking about and trying to articulate why we reject I could do no better than penciling down how Modalism is directly contrary to the God explained in scripture. Don't get me wrong, that in and of itself is enough to reject a certain teaching, especially one concerning the Trinity. But I wanted to offer my kids (if they asked, which they didn't) something more than "obviously this isn't how God is spoken about in scriptures." Don't get me wrong, I have a very high view of the scriptures and I believe them to be very clear that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are three different persons and yet all fully divine but the scriptures can be distorted and indeed they were used by the modalists to corrupt the teaching of the Godhead.
And so I decided this week that I wasn't going to look up the answer in Pelikan's history, a book on doctrine, or in the works of Irrenaeus and other such prolific defenders of the faith. I decided this because I have no doubts that the belief in Modalism is detrimental to our faith and it corrupts how we think about God. I also know that I have worked through this in the past but am merely drawing a blank. So I ask those of you more theologically astute than I am to post your thoughts on this.
It seems to me the Modalism largely strikes at the incarnation. The description is on the tip of my tongue but I cannot seem to fully articulate it. I had hoped writing this blog post would help me to be able to articulate things but it hasn't worked this time. If each person of the Trinity is not really a person but just a "mode" of God or a temporary manifestation of God (as Modalism teaches) then it seems that something about our redemption in Christ is incomplete. It seems that if Christ is just a mode then was humanity really assumed and redeemed? For we know as St. Basil states; "that which was not assumed cannot be redeemed" (paraphrase).
It also seems that if the Spirit is just a mode of some ethereal divine essence then I wonder how fully dwells within believers. I am so frustrated because I sense all these problems with Modalism and yet I cannot fully articulate it. So give input and we can have ourselves a nice old fashioned heresy bashing party.
Glory be to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit now and ever and unto ages of ages. Amen.
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Historically speaking, the main controversy over modalism is the 3rd century Roman schism between Zephyrinus/Callixtus and Hippolytus regarding the so-called "patripassionism". We don't really know anything about modalism (or Sabellius) apart from the writings of this controversy. Behr has a whole chapter on this in "The Way to Nicea."
That being said, there seem to be two problems with modalism. The first problem comes up in the Roman debates: that modalism would imply that the Father has suffered on the cross. This would of course make the whole "Christ as the mediator between us and the Father" problematic. Further, is does away with the impassibility of God. If God is passable, He becomes like the pagan gods and is not Lord over creation.
The second problem deals with the permanency of the incarnation. If God is only the person of Christ for a time, then there is no hypostatic union, but instead a temporal or modal union where God unites himself to mankind only during the time he was operating in that mode. In post-Nicene, post-Palamite theology this would be the same as saying that huamity was united to an energy of God. In other words, there is no "substantial" union.
Wow Nathaniel... you're brilliant! What an explanation!
My input?
Well, you have a typo in the third paragraph, third sentence..."I can could"...what's that all about?
here's my simple understanding (and I'm sure this falls woefully short of logic and reason and niceties of philosophy):
if the Father and the Son shared in person-hood, it would be impossible for the Son to act as propitiation for sin through his death, since in effect the Father would be killing himself. Furthermore, if the Son shared the person-hood of the Father, he would not have been completely human and therefore his death would not suffice as an replacing atonement for the sins of humanity.
If the Spirit and the Son shared in person-hood, the Son would not have died, since the Spirit cannot die.
If the Spirit and the Father shared in person-hood, the Son would not have died, since the Spirit as 'comforter' does not kill or destroy but restores and strengthens bonds.
The fact that history played out the way it did is because God is true to himself in each of his aspects, eternally relating and satisfying all aspects of truth within himself. The wonder to me is that this God chooses to align himself with humanity, and through his trinitarian person-hood fulfill all that is required for us to be restored to relationship with Him. In a sense, as the architect of history, He planned it all this way because of who He is.
Now you can tell me what heresies I may have inadvertently committed...
Hiram,
There are several problems with the model you have put forward.
First, in the understanding of "atonement" where Christ is propitiation for the wrath of God you oppose the Father and Son. Any understanding of atonement which makes an arbitrary law or punishment of God greater than the love of God for His only begotten Son is seriously at odds with the Gospels. The reason the Son takes human flesh upon Himself is so that we might be united to God, the source of life. It is not to fulfil some fickle requirement that humans must die because of sin. Remember, the law was created for man, not man for the law. The law exists that we might know the Son in his coming. The law does *not* exist so that the Son can jump through hoops so the Father mark each requirement before he pours out His wrath upon the Son. The law exists for the Son, not the Son for the law.
Second, in arguing that the Spirit and the Son do not share in personhood, you are not arguing what you think you are arguing. You are *actually* arguing for a difference in nature between the Son and the Spirit (according to classic Nicene terminology). Your argument is a slight variation on the Arian argument. It would be possible to re-phrase your argument as "If the Father and the Son shared in person-hood, the Son would not have died, since the Father cannot die." This is clearly (semi-?)Arian. This Arianism is further cemented by implying both "the Father kills the Son" and "the Spirit does not kill or destroy." In your model you then have the Holy Spirit as the first principle, the Father as a demiurge and the Son as a synthesis between the two. This type of reasoning is rather common in the Western tradition after the filioque and especially post-Hegal and represents a severe rupture with ancient patristic thought. It is particularly these problems that us anti-filioqueists avoid. :)
Finally, your last paragraph is, forgive me for my bluntness, a pagan understanding of God in which there is some necessity (i.e. truth) within God's nature creating a variance in his nature (or even worse external to God's nature). You also seem to imply that sin exists in the world due to the nature of God. God is not the author of sin, neither in His actions, His person nor His nature.
In short, you're obviously a bright guy. I'd suggest that you begin with the ancient understandings of the trinity, incarnation and atonement and work your way forward: Paul -> John -> Ignatius -> Justin Martyr -> Irenaeus -> Hippolytus -> Origen -> Arius/Nicea. You will surprisingly find (as I did) that your understanding of God is not the early Christian understanding.
I look forward to hearing more from you...
Hm... I will definitely look into that. Though I disagree with a couple of your points.
1. regarding my understanding of atonement. I would argue that atonement/propitiation exists to fulfil God's will, which is love. God's greatest (perhaps only) love is for himself, since He is most worthy of it. This love extends to his created beings because through his creation of them he imbues them with some aspect of himself (as an artist does his canvas). Therefore he pursues his creation in order to restore it/them to himself (this does not demean humans as much as it glorifies them, once the full measure of His love for Himself is understood) - Jesus is the means by which this purpose is fulfilled, not in opposition to the Father but in covenant with him (Jesus 'lays down his life for the sheep' in response to the desires of the Father, which are also his own desires, though difficult to reconcile with the pain he experiences as human).
2. my distinction between the Spirit and Son is made in conjunction with the distinction between the Son and Father & Father and Spirit. in some sense it is functional (like art is often functional) - the Spirit does not kill, so the Father (if sharing completely the person-hood of the Spirit) would not be able to allow the Son's death (in legal terms, allowing death can be equated with killing). This is simply a logical argument for differentiation between the persons, yet fails (a metaphor might be better) to fully explain the differences. And yet the similarity is that in will and purpose the three are one - the unity they experience is in pursuit of the working-out of their (His) nature.
3. when I talk about truth or another aspect of God's nature motivating Him, it is not because the aspect is external in any means, but that He is and embodies that quality so much more than we can begin to imagine - we use these words to describe qualities which we can only catch a glimpse of, and which find their most complete definition in God Himself. This is partly why explaining the Trinity is so hard - because our minds are finite.
4. my understanding of God is that the Father is the head, the Spirit proceeds from Him, and the Son proceeds from both the Father and the Spirit. Yet all exist together and from the beginning of time. this is why we say with the Jews 'The Lord our God, the Lord is ONE.'
5. A Good creator takes responsibility for his creation. A great mystery I have always struggled with is Sin and Evil. If God allows Sin, is that the same as if He created it? What I have to keep in mind is that at the end of time God destroys Sin completely - and time is as one to Him, so in reality He does not allow sin. yet in the interim, which we experience, this sin is allowed to function - giving everyone a choice and an opportunity to 'master it' (what God says to Cain in the second-third chapter of Genesis) - a choice that we ultimately fail in without a relationship with Jesus.
6. my last paragraph is not an attempt to explain God in terms of humanity, but to explain humanity and history in terms of God and His nature, an aspect of which (and the foundation of which) is trinitarian. Since God is infinite, this attempt obviously falls short.
I'd enjoy your return comments, though perhaps we should continue this in a different forum (unless Ben doesn't mind). It's difficult to describe the point we are starting from, and to move closer to a definition of trinity without slipping into heresy due to gray areas that would be clear if we were both sharing the same direct perspective. But to not know where the other stands makes it easy to assume differences.
I'm sure Ben won't mind, so long as we are cordial... right Ben?
Before I start, I should point out that I'm not so much arguing that your perspective is wrong so much as I am arguing that it is not the ancient Christian understanding. What motivation do we have, apart from fulfilling our own philosophical speculations, in positing a different understanding than the ancients (except where they have fallen into heresy, usually through philosophical speculation)?
1. Does God will the death of Christ? The scriptures say that God does not wish that any should perish. Further, the kerygma, as proclaimed in Acts (2:23), takes great pains to show that it was *we* who put Christ to death.
2. If, as the 6th Eccumenical Council proclaims, there is one divine will shared by the three persons and according to your legal definition, allowing somone to kill is equated with killing, how does the Holy Spirit not kill if the Father kills?
3. God does not embody Truth, He IS Truth. The things which we know as true are true only in as much as they reflect God. This is standard Christian ontology. Pagan ontology is that there are forms such as Truth which, existing independanly or within God, which may be instantiated or embodied by God. The reason you speak in such terms is because during the middle ages Western theology was conquered by neo-platonism of the Aristotalian variety, resulting in ...
4. ... the filioque. I'm assuming in your paragraph #4 you meant that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. There have been volumes written on this topic, most of which have never even been read by Western theologians who consider their philosophical speculation *about* God to be on par with the patristic experience *of* God.
5. Sin has no ontological existance. Sin is the privation of the good. We were always created to particpate more and more in God. Sinning is our choice to particpate more and more in ourselves alone. God is good because he has created something beautiful. We are evil because we destroy it. God doesn't destroy evil because evil doesn't exist (so it can't possibly be destroyed). The only thing God can destroy is that which exits (i.e. the good). Thus he recapitulates human existance in Christ, hypostatically uniting the divine with the material. As much as we choose to be united to him, we will become divine. Those who choose to reject God will eventually be reunited to God, with or without their choice. Those who hate God will burn in the everlasting fire which is the very love of God they hate. This centrality of the will of man in evil is the important consideration in the condemnation of monothelitism.
6. The reason why the satisfaction model is so inutterably broken is because if there is something in God which requires satisfaction, then God is incomplete; He is passable. It basically boils down to: if the Son were not to suffer, than the Father would suffer (not being satisfied). So instead the Son, out of love for the Father, offers Himself to the wrath of God so that the Father will be satisfied. Notice how similar this is in character to patripassionism. Its a bizare artifact of the subtle modalism that exists within Western theology defining the persons as relations of the essence with itself rather than substantial (hypostatic) persons.
The fundamental problem here is the conquering of Western theology by neo-platonism. "God" is defined as an inapproachable essence (rather than the person of the Father, as Nicea clearly defines). Because of this, the persons are merely relations of the essense to itself (similar to Aeons in some Gnostic terminology). Further the Son can just as much process the Holy Spirit because the Logos prosesses from the Father (nevermind the Nicene distinction between beggeting and processing). Even further, the attributes of God are, akin to platonic forms, eternal with God. And so, because of the eternal Form of "Justice," whenever justice against the law of God is not had, God must find a way to satisfy himself.
The end result of all this is an "attonement" theory where the Father kills the Son out of vengence. This is ripped straight out of pagan theology (gods in Greek thought are always killing each other to obtain satisfaction against the platonic form of justice). Finally, of course, all this philosophical speculation must be tied to the scriptures. So they image the platonic fall and divine ascent against the Scriptures and invent a linear "salvation history" with an Ademic fall and divine ascent through good philosophy.
The ancient understanding is somewhat different. We were created immature with the purpose of "growing into God." Complicating the matter, we introduced death into the world. Christ recapitulates all of human existance, uniting the divine nature to our nature in the person of Christ. By uniting our person with Christ, in the sacraments and through exercising the divine image in particpation with the divine energies, we become divine. The incarnation was always the intention of God, "Fall" or not. The result of our salvation is something far greater than Adam ever had. That being said, the Incarnation is not a response to a "Fall" and "history" of mankind becomes not a "salvation history" but a history of the nature of God and man (this primarily plays out in the Hippolytan controversy in the early 3rd century).
In conclusion, your understanding of God has much more in common with Aristotle than with Ignatius, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Origen, Athanasius, Ambrose, etc. Its not a matter of you "arguing better" since "logic" is not the question. Its a matter of having the faith that was delivered once and for all to the saints (i.e. the apostles). Its a matter of unlearning (for a time) philosophical reflection so that theology can be the master of philosophy, not the other way around.
I hope this is somewhat helpful...
You two can keep discussing this here all you want. I have no worries about it becoming uncivil since I know you both and have high regards for both of you. Personally I love reading the post and am re-learning quite a bit.
Nathaniel, In your comments you wrote something akin to: "the incarnation was always in the plan of God - fall or not." I don't disagree with this point, but I do wonder how it fits with Athanasian Christology as articulated in "On the Incarnation." St. Athanasius seems to suggest that the incarnation is reactionary, unless he is just using rhetoric to convey his points. Thoughts on this? I'm specifically referencing II:6ff.
One more comment:
Nathaniel, I would appreciate it if you would stop cursing on my blog. I can't stand that you keep using the word Origen. Ha ha. =)
But seriously, I am curious why you keep referring to him in your line of great and wondrous saints. I agree he had a huge influence and was orthodox most of his days, but he was, after all, condemned a heretic after his death.
Ben,
Regarding Athanasian Christology, you are right, he does describe the incarnation as somewhat reactionary. I think there are two compound problems in this text. The first is that the Alexandrian school is very learned in Platonism (its what caused the whole Arian problem in the first place). Because of this, Athanasius undoubtedly phrases things according to the language of that school. The second problem comes when we read Athanasius from a Platonic mindset. In doing so we pick up all the Platonic terminology and emphasis and accentuate it. I think there are great problems with this reading, because, although sympathetic to some Platonc terminology, there are a great many parts of "On the Incarnation" that cannot be read in this way. In short, Athanasius borrows from Platonism but does not enslave himself to it (as did Arius). Further, we should be careful to understand Athanasius within his patristic setting, not merely as an isolated commentator. My main point still holds, viewing "salvation history" as a fall and ascent is a paradigm from Platonism. In some cases it is a handy tool, in others it is a deadly heresy.
You are right, we must be careful with Origen and he is clearly a heretic, though not in Christology. He is the first person to argue for "two Gods" as hypostatic persons. Irenaeus uses hypostasis to refer to the oneness of God. In "Proof of the Apostolic Preaching" paragraph 47, he says: "And so in the substance (hypostasis) and power of His being there is shown forth one God; but there is also according to the economy of our redemption both Son and Father." This becomes a trouble spot in the Hippolytan controversy because the modalists (Callistus, Zephynirus, etc) take this to mean that there are not "substantial" (hypostatic) persons, but they are merely modes of the substance (hypostasis). the problem here is that the modalists have retained Irenaeus' terminology while departing from his meaning. It is Origen who provides the resolution to this controversy by suggesting that there are two hypostasis and one ousia. He returns to Irenaeus' meaning, using different terminology. Ultimately it is the theologies of Ignatius, Irenaeus, Hippolytus and Origen which are upheld at Nicea, using Origen's terminology.
Hiram, just thought I'd say, I like your music!
Thanks, Nathaniel!
great thoughts - I see what you mean about coming from a neo-platonic mindset which is ultimately pagan in origin. In some ways it is useful, but in some ways it does obscure Truth.
a couple questions/thoughts:
regarding your point #2 (which ties into #1), logically I would make a distinction between 'will' and 'ability'. I would say that the Spirit may have the will of the Father, but not share in all the abilities of the Father, though this distinction is most likely too sharp in English to be close to the truth of the actual relationship. Further I would argue that 'atonement' as a concept dates from the creation of the world in the biblical narrative, and was the way that the Jews (and other peoples) understood their relationship with God since the time of Abraham and even Adam. To say that this is not a true concept (if I understand you rightly) is to in some sense negate scripture. I admit that the purpose of atonement is to restore relationship, and that the death of Christ, caused by humans, need not have happened. And yet... the very fact that it did happen speaks to our depravity.
Continuing this train of thought, if we claim God the Father as supreme in all things, then He knew it would happen and in a sense purposed it to be - not because He wanted to kill Christ, but because we humans required that sort of sacrifice (having introduced death into the world). I suppose the question that is hard to answer is: If God wills the outcome (restoration of relationship) does He then will each of the acts that lead up to the outcome? this is one I'm still struggling with.
The uniting of God and Man is a key concept, and I think you are suggesting that this will not completely be achieved until the end of time as we know it, though through Christ we can know some of its joys. at the moment, though, our understanding of God is locked within time, which is why we interpret the three Persons of the Godhead within the bounds of History, though we posit the relationships as unbounded by the linear time we experience.
I'm not sure that atonement is the same as satisfaction? perhaps it is. In any case, I would suggest that the term should be understood not as necessary for God, but as necessary for Humans to approach God.
In this sense, sin's effects are evident. Sin, as 'lack of Good', has negative effects, which define it as a 'thing'. Ontologically it may be the absence of something, but this absence has very real effects that make it appear as a force in and of itself, which is why it has a name. Still hard to wrap my mind around.
So I really like a lot of what you're saying, but it's hard to line it up with the breadth and scope of Scripture for me, and to believe that the ancient understanding ignores atonement or sacrifice. Is that what you're saying?
I'm not suggesting to do away with the atonement. However, the terminology which is guiding your thought is extremely "legal" in nature. Certainly, there is a legal component in our salvation (as there is legal metaphor in the Scriptures). However, the Western theological mind, having been developed by some of the greatest lawyers ever known, has tended to recast all of salvation in legal terms. This is problematic, at best, if for no other reason than the "legal" metaphor is not the primary metaphor of the Scriptures.
I should also preface by saying that I'm not arguing for something new, but for something older, much older. The way in which the Scriptures are read in the early Church are markedly different than modern Western Christianity. The ancients take very seriously when Christ says (John 5:39) "You search the Scriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life; and these are they which testify of Me." Irenaeus, trying to explain this to the Gnostics, calls Christ the "hypothesis" of the Scriptures. His point is that the Gnostics do not understand how to read the scriptures. They do not understand that the Scriptures, particularly the OT (there is no NT canon at this point), are not a blueprint of the cosmic relationship between God and man. Irenaeus explains (as Justin and Ignatius and Clement had done before) that the Scriptures are holy because in them speaks the Word (logos) of God. What does the logos say? He is proclaiming his own coming in the flesh. The reason the Jews had the scriptures and the sacrificial system is so that they would not miss Christ when he appears! This is the universal hermeneutic of the pre-Nicene Church, and it is the hermeneutic of the Orthodox Church to this day.
What could this possibly have to do with our discussion? The predominant mode of reading the Scriptures in the modern Roman Catholic and Protestant worlds is fundamentally Gnostic: the scriptures are a blueprint for the cosmic relationship between God and man. I don't wholly reject this methodology, but it has some problems. In the context of our current discussion of "atonement" we have the problem of the atonement as a reflection of the nature of God. The atonement of Judaism is rather gruesome. I don't think you would suggest that we start back up ritual animal sacrifice to appease God. Yet when reading this as the blueprint of the cosmic relationship between God and man we see that God has a bizarre sense of "justice" where he creates an arbitrary law, punishes us with death if we do not fulfil it, then accepts the death of someone else in our stead. No judge today would remain a judge for long if he thought such "justice." Yet, when we read Christ as the hypothesis of the Scriptures, everything changes. The purpose of the sacrificial system is not to appease a twisted notion of justice in God, but to prepare us for the coming of His Son, the suffering servant. If you read the OT this way, a whole new world opens up to you. Suddenly, you realize why the psalmist says "For You do not delight in sacrifice, otherwise I would give it; You are not pleased with burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; A broken and a contrite heart, O God, You will not despise." The law, as St. Paul says, is the "tutor of Christ." This is why NT authors can use the OT seemingly "out of context" to talk about Christ. Because the Scriptures are ultimately about Him.
Thus, the law, and in particular the sacrificial system, do not primarily describe the cosmic relationship of God to man, but the coming of His Son. To read the passion of Christ as though it appeases something in the Father is not only at severe discord with the Scriptures but is ultimately to see God as a terrorist.
Now, with that said, let me address some of your specific comments.
Regarding your first paragraph, the Father does not will the death of the Son. Paraphrasing Acts 2, it is we who killed him, but God raised Him from the dead. We killed God. Think about that. We killed life itself. How much do we hate God? God himself comes offering us life more abundantly and our response is to kill him. In the Orthodox Church, on Great and Holy Friday, we stand before the cross and sing "He who suspended the Earth upon the waters now hangs on a tree." We killed God because death is all we have to offer. Yet Christ has taken on even death itself. As we sing every Pascha, "Christ is risen from the dead, trampling down death by death (itself)." In Christ, life itself has purged the very depths of hades. The purpose of the death of Christ was to unite death to life itself. It is not about appeasing the "justice" of the Father. The purpose of the law is to show us that life will come in death, which is only to be found in Christ and His passion. Because Christ is the hypothesis of the Scriptures, the law was made for Christ, not Christ for the law.
Regarding your second paragraph, you are not allowing for the substantial weight of our free will. God did not will the death of His Son, though the Son freely accepted it. *We* put Christ to death of our own free will. But look at this, in our own free will, we have allowed God to unite himself with our whole human nature, even death itself. Don't get caught up in a fatalistic understanding of God's will, it is a heresy and always has been.
I am actually *not* suggesting that we will not be united to God in this life. This is one of the distinct theologies of the Orthodox Church (though not distinct among the Fathers): Theosis. We believe that creation is fundamentally good and that we can participate in God fully through the co-operation of the divine energies. Though, admittedly, this is much more difficult in this life due to the "old man" as Paul calls it. This is why God has given us the ascetic life of prayer, fasting, celebacy, charity, poverty, etc: the monastic life.
Regarding the effects of sin, these too are not a "thing" but the lack of a thing, namely God who is life itself (YHWH). Suffering is a lack of wholeness, lust is a lack of love for God, deciet is a lack of truth, greed is a lack of charity, etc.
For an excelent book which covers a good amount of this material, read "The Mystery of Christ: Life in Death" by Fr. Dr. John Behr. You can read quite a bit of the book online for free here: http://books.google.com/books?id=MiRd9CqySfcC&printsec=frontcover
For much more substantial reading along the same lines, read Dr. Behr's "The Way to Nicea" which chronicles the theological journey of theological reflection from the apostles to the Council of Nicea.
Ben, feel free to jump in here at any time... ;)
Jump in huh? Yeah, I'm still striving to comprehend it all. I'm not sure I have anything substantial to add at this point.
Though be sure that if I think of something I'll add it. For now I'm just enjoying the discussion.
That really clarifies things for me, actually. I think...
I totally agree with you that we killed Christ. And that the OT is the Word revealing Himself and predicting the coming of the Son. It even predicts the way He would die.
I guess what I come up against is 'justification through faith alone' and understanding the sacrifice of Christ as salvific through his ultimate resurrection. ('If you declare with your mouth that Christ died for your sins and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead...') But what you are saying is that his sacrifice is not as essential as his resurrection? Are we to keep one without the other?
I think we can see that creation is fundamentally good simply because it exists (existence being the antithesis of evil). In my earlier comment I was trying to distinguish between ontological reality and descriptive terminology.
Let me state again that the death of Christ happened because humanity required (wanted) it. I would also add that it was within God's will. Until this discussion I would have also said that it was required by God, but now I'll have to re-think this one through. I think in this you and I are on the same page, though perhaps different paragraphs. To clarify - you would avoid calling Christ's sacrifice remuneration for sin and instead call it unnecessary but inevitable?
I suppose I've always seen sin and evil as embodied in Satan, the accuser, and thought of Christ's death as Satan's attempt at final conquest - to annihilate the giver of life Himself. And Christ as the triumphant King whom death could not hold due to his complete lack of evil. This returns to the legal metaphor of humanity as children of darkness rather than children of light, until redeemed by the cleansing blood of the lamb.
Regarding free will - if God created us and knows us better than we know ourselves, how could He not know what choices we would make in every situation? Freedom to choose good is only possible through the work of the Spirit (who I believe works in the lives of unbelievers as well). This is the freedom that Christ redeems us for and calls us to as believers.
'Justification through faith alone' is an important scriptural topic, though it does not mean what protestants think it means. Protestants have deployed 'sola fide' as a polemic against Roman heresy, creating a faith/works dichotomy where 'works' are defined largely as the piety of faithful Catholics. Aside from the fact that this is pastorally destructive, there are other problems with this methodology. Justification through faith alone must be understood through the lens of the logos as voice and subject of the OT. Because, for Paul, the law is a 'tutor of Christ', the law exists to prepare us for Christ. If this is true, what use is there for the law *after* Christ has come? This is why the law is no longer useful and why we are saved by faith in Christ. The Latin theological Tradition has a great distinction between the 'sign' and the 'thing' the sign signifies. The law is the 'sign' that signifies Christ. The Judaisers want to, while they possess Christ, return to the law. This makes no sense.
Further, for Paul, "faith in Christ" is not a mere rational assent, but a sacramental union. Because Christ has united himself to our human nature, we are justified in the degree we unite ourselves to Him. Thus, St Paul says in Romans 6:3ff:
"Brethren, do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life. For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we shall certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his."
When Paul says "If you declare with your mouth that Christ died for your sins..." this is likely a reference to the baptismal canon which declares exactly this. Thus, we see that the proper context for justification is actually sacramental. In baptism, the 'sign' of the water unites us to the 'thing' of Christ in His death. In the Eucharist, the 'sign' of the bread and wine become the 'thing' of Christ in his death and again we are united to His death.
Thus, where the law was inefficacious because it was the 'sign' only, the sacraments are efficacious because the 'sign' unites us to the 'thing'. Christ has died for our sins precisely because in uniting ourselves with His death we will be united also in His resurrection. Thus, the death of Christ and His resurrection are intimately connected. Further, St Paul can say that "if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost. If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are to be pitied more than all men." (1 Cor 15:17-19)
The will of God is, and was, always the same: that Christ would be united to human nature that we may "be partakers of the divine nature." The nature of humanity is to not exist. Only God exists of Himself. So we were created and sustained by the Grace of God which brings us out of non-existence (death) and to life. God's will was always to make such life in us an intrinsic thing through the assumption of our nature in Christ. Whether we chose "life" or "death" in the garden, the remedy was always the same: union with Christ.
However, Eve chose death. Adam chose death. Cain chose death. Every human since has chosen death until "the fullness of time" when the virgin chose Life. In saying "yes" to God, Mary undid the curse of Eve through the birth-giving of Christ. In choosing life, she gave human nature to Life itself and Christ entered the world. However, because Mary (the new Eve) was the only one of us that chose life, this meant that Christ must suffer and die. Thus, the incarnation was always the will of God. However, the death of Christ was never God's will. It was Adam's will, Eve's will, Cain's will and the will of every human who came afterword and chose death instead of life (including myself!), making Christ "slain from the foundation of the world" (Adam's and Eve's sins). Christ's death is necessary, but only insomuch that we have made it necessary by choosing death over life.
You understand Satan correctly, he is evil "embodied." However, this is his will, not God's. Satan chose it. Evil is possible only inasmuch as we have free will to chose the good. It is this principle regarding evil and free will that makes Augustine's understanding of will so nonsensical, namely that we are only free to chose evil before baptism (thus salvation is predestination). We cannot do evil without the corresponding will to chose the good. All of this is of course accomplished by the Spirit, as you mention, who also gives us life as well as the ability to chose death. Though, this work of the Spirit is not the 'Action-Response' phrasing which Augustine insists on, but rather one of co-operation. This is the reason why it is John Cassian who the Church reveres as the one who tought correctly against Pelagius, not Augustine. In Augustine's understanding of the will, namely that "sin" is passed on through the concupiscence of sex to each generation and therefore no human ever has a will to chose the good until Christ/baptism, how is Mary ever able to chose "Yes" to the incarnation? For Catholics, this is the "immaculate conception" where Mary is born without sin. For Calvin, the incarnation was the "Holy rape of the unsuspecting will." Other protestants ignore the problem by ignoring Mary. The real solution is rejecting St. Augustine's new understanding of the will that doesn't exist before him.
I should correct myself, Augustine strongly develops his concept of the will from seeds of thought in Origen. Though, its just as wrong in Origen too. :)
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